EXTRACTS FROM THE 16TH MAY STATEMENT OF THE CABINET MISSION

We recommend that the constitution should take the following basic form:-
(1) There should be a Union of India, embracing both iritish India and the States, which should deal with the following subjects: foreign affairs, defence, and communications; id which should have the powers necessary to raise the inances required for the above subjects.

(2) The Union should have an Executive and a egislature constituted from British-Indian and State representatives. Any question raising a major communal issue in the Legislature should require for its decision a majority of the representatives present and voting of each of the two major communities as well as a majority of all the members present and voting.

(3) All subjects other than the Union subjects and all residuary powers should vest in the Provinces.

(4) The States will retain all subjects and powers other than those ceded to the Union.

(5) Provinces should be free to form Groups with ectives and legislatures, and each Group could determine the provincial subjects to be taken in common.
(6) The constitutions of the Union and of the Groups tould contain a provision whereby any province could, by a majority vote of its Legislative Assembly, call for a reconsideration of the terms of the constitution after an initial period of 10 years and at 10 yearly intervals thereafter.

16. It is not our object to lay out the details of a constitution on the above lines, but to set in motion the machinary whereby a constitution can be settled by Indians for Indians. It has been necessary however for us to make this recommendation as to the broad basis of the future constitution because it became clear to us in the course of our negotiations that not until that had been done was there any hope of getting the two major communities to join in the setting up of the constitution-making machinary.

17. We now indicate the constitution-making machinary which we propose should be brought into being forthwith in order to enable a new constitution to be worked out.

18. In forming any Assembly to decide a new constitutional structure the first problem is to obtain as broad-based and accurate a representation of the whole population as is possible. The most satisfactory method obviously would be by election based on adult franchise; but any attempt to introduce such a step now would lead to a wholly unacceptable delay in the formulation of the new constitution.

The only practicable alternative is to utilize the recently elected provincial Legislative Assemblies as the electing bodies. There are, however, two factors in their composition which make this difficult. First, the numerical strength of the provincial Legislative Assemblies do not bear the same proportion to the total population in each provice.

Thus, Assam with a population of 10 millions has a Legislative Assembly of 108 members, while Bengal, with a population six times as large, has an Assembly of only 250. Secondly, owing to the weightage given to niinorities by the Communal Award, the strengths of the several communities in each provincial Legislative Assembly are not in proportion to their numbers in the province.

Thus the number of seats reserved for Muslims in the Bengal Legislative Assembly is only 48% of the total, although they form 55% of the provincial population. After a most careful consideration of the various methods by which these inequalities might be corrected, we have come to the conclusion that the fairest and most practicable plan would be-
(a) to allot to each province a total number of seats proportional to its population, roughly in the ratio of one to a million, as the nearest substitute for representation by adult suffrage.
(b) to divide this provincial allocation of seats between the main communities in each province in proportion to their population.
(c) to provide that the representatives allotted to each community in a province shall be elected by the members of that community in its Legislative Assembly.

We think that for these purposes it is sufficient to recognise only three main communities in India; General, Muslim, and Sikh, the 'General' community including all persons who are not Muslims or Sikhs. As the smaller minorities would, upon the population basis, have little of no representation since they would lose the weightage which assures them seats in the provincial Legislatures, we have made the arrangements set out in paragraph 20 below to give them a full representation upon all matters of special interest to the minorities.

19. (i) We therefore propose that there shall be elected by each provincial Legislative Assembly the following numbers of representatives, each part of the Legislature (General, Muslim or Sikh) electing its own representatives by the method of proportional with the single transferable vote:-
(ii) It is the intention that the States should be given in the final Constituent Assembly appropriate representation which would not, on the basis of the calculationss adopted for British India, exceed 93, but the method of selection will have to be determined by consultation. The States would in the preliminary stage be represented by a Negotiating Committee.
(iii) The representatives thus chosen shall meet at New Delhi as soon as possible.

21. His Excellency the Viceroy will forthwith request the provincial Legislatures to proceed with the election of their representatives and the States to set up a Negotiating Committee, It is hoped that the process of constitution-making can proceed as rapidly as the complexities of the task permit so that the interim period may be as short as possible.

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